The
Bush Administration’s
fixation on security and
the “war on terror” is
already escalating the
militarization of U.S.
policy in Africa in
2008. In his last year
in office, President
George W. Bush will no
doubt duplicitously
continue to promote
economic policies that
exacerbate inequalities
while seeking to salvage
his legacy as a
compassionate
conservative with
rhetorical support for
addressing human rights
challenges including
conflict in Sudan and
continued promotion of
his unilateral HIV/AIDS
initiative. The third
prong of U.S.-Africa
policy in 2008 will be
the continued and
relentless pursuit of
African resources,
especially oil, with
clear implications for
U.S. military and
economic policy.
In this election
year, the U.S.
government will pursue a
mixed approach to
elections in Africa,
upholding democratic
ideals or looking the
other way, depending on
military, economic and
political alliances.
Climate change will be a
hot topic in U.S.
electoral debates, but
it is unlikely that the
devastating
environmental prospects
for Africa will be
featured, much less
addressed, in
U.S.-Africa policy this
year.
Militarizing Aid
The United States has
dramatically ramped up
military activity in
Africa since 2002.
Representative Donald
Payne (D-NJ), Chairman
of the Subcommittee on
Africa and Global Health
on the House Committee
for Foreign Affairs, and
many others have
described this trend as
the “militarization of
U.S. aid to Africa.” The
total amount of U.S.
military sales,
financing and training
expenditures for eight
African countries
considered particularly
strategic for the “war
on terror” has increased
from about $40 million
over the five years from
1997 through 2001 to
over $130 million
between 2002 and 2006.
According to a
Congressional Research
Service report
released in May of 2007,
the United States has
recently established
military,
counter-terrorism and
intelligence programs in
dozens of African
countries. The Combined
Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa (CJTF-HOA) has
been using Camp Lemonier
in Djibouti as its main
U.S. base for
counter-terrorist
activities offshore and
in the region since
October 2002. In January
2007, the military
announced that Camp
Lemonier will expand
from its current 97
acres to more than 500
acres.
Under the
Trans-Sahara
Counter-Terrorism
Initiative (TSCTI), the
Pentagon has provided
$500 million to increase
border security and
counter-terrorism
capacity to Mali, Chad,
Niger and Mauritania.
The Africa Contingency
Operations Training and
Assistance Program
(ACOTA) has provided
small arms and training
for peacekeeping
operations to Benin,
Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Kenya, Malawi,
Mozambique, Nigeria,
Senegal, South Africa,
Uganda and Zambia.
The Gulf of Guinea
now features nearly
continuous U.S. naval
patrols, up from almost
no activity in 2004. The
Navy currently monitors
countries from Guinea to
Angola. The Defense
Department has also
agreed on access to air
bases and ports in
Africa and "bare-bones"
facilities maintained by
local security forces in
Gabon, Kenya, Mali,
Morocco, Namibia, Sao
Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda
and Zambia.
Private Sector Role
Deepening U.S.
military ties to the
African continent are
visible in both the
official and private
sectors. Since 2002, the
U.S. International
Military and Training
Program (IMET) has
invested approximately
$10 million a year to
train African military
personnel, and the FY
2008 budget request
increased this sum to
$13.7 million. At the
same time, under State
Department oversight,
commercial sales by U.S.
manufacturers delivered
$281 million worth of
weapons and equipment
from FY 2006-2007 to
Algeria alone. Such
licensed commercial
sales to sub-Saharan
Africa were just
$900,000 in 2000, but
for FY 2008 they are
estimated to reach $92
million, an 80% increase
from FY 2006. At
present, the U.S. has
Cooperative Security
Location (CSL)
agreements with five
African countries, which
are now operational in
Entebbe, Uganda;
Libreville, Gabon;
Accra, Ghana; Dakar,
Senegal; and Lusaka,
Zambia. There is also a
new joint U.S.-Ugandan
intelligence fusion
center, just outside of
Kampala in Uganda.
This escalation has
not gone unnoticed.
Concerned civil society
groups in the U.S. and
across the continent of
Africa have expressed
persistent apprehension
over the potential
dangers of this change
and the absence of any
accountability in the
process. Democratic
governance, sustainable
development and human
rights are serious
challenges in many
countries in Africa, but
considerable progress
has been made by
activists, advocates,
and civil society
organizations over the
last few decades. The
militarization of aid to
Africa could
dramatically sharpen the
slope of this already
uphill battle for
social, political and
economic justice on the
continent.
The militarization of
Africa comes at a time
when the continent can
least afford it. An
Oxfam report on
armed conflict in Africa
released in October
estimates that the cost
of conflict at the
expense of the
continent's development
over a 15-year period
was nearly $300 billion.
According to this study,
between 1990 and 2005,
23 African nations were
involved in conflict,
and on average this cost
African economies $18
billion a year. By these
figures, the cost of
conflict was equal to
the amount of money
received in aid during
the same period.
The fundamental
question for many is
whether the U.S. will
utilize this increased
military presence to
support freedom, self
determination, growth,
prosperity, and
accountability on behalf
of the majority of the
nearly one billion
people in Africa or if
this new initiative will
instead serve to oversee
surrogate nations whose
leadership is
accountable first to
U.S. security and
economic interests.
AFRICOM’s
Inspiration
This growing
militarization of
U.S.-Africa policy is
certain to escalate
sharply in 2008 as the
United States hurtles
full speed ahead with
the launch of Bush’s
still ill-defined Africa
Command (AFRICOM). While
AFRICOM appears to be a
done deal, with a budget
request of $389 for FY
2009, the public
explanations and
justifications for it
can only be described as
seriously confusing if
not downright evasive.
In October 2003,
James Jay Carafano and
Nile Gardiner, both from
the Heritage Foundation,
a conservative think
tank, proposed to the
Bush Administration the
creation of a
centralized Africa
command for the U.S.
military. The
Carafano/Gardiner
proposal makes clear
that the objective is to
preserve U.S. access to
African oil and other
natural resources on the
continent. Africa
produces 90% of the
world’s cobalt; 64% of
its manganese; 50% of
gold; 40% of platinum;
30% of uranium; 20% of
total petroleum; 70% of
cocoa; 60% of coffee;
over 80% of coltan and
50% of palm oil. The
Heritage report also
points to the strategic
importance of Africa in
the global “war on
terror.” This proposal
resonated with the Bush
administration.
Altruistic Motives?
AFRICOM began initial
operations in October
2007 with temporary
headquarters in
Stuttgart, Germany. But
much like 150 years ago
when Western countries
argued that their real
goals in Africa were to
bring liberty and
democratic ideals to the
continent, the Bush
Administration has been
trying to convince
skeptical audiences in
Africa and elsewhere
that AFRICOM is
ultimately driven by
altruistic motives.
AFRICOM’s projected
structure would place
humanitarian work
previously done by the
State Department and the
U.S. Agency for
International
Development (USAID)
under the directive of
Department of Defense
(DOD). To U.S. and
African civil society
groups, and even to
AFRICOM’s critics in
Congress, the Bush
administration has
argued that the State
Department will remain
responsible for
diplomacy and
development while
AFRICOM will “support”
USAID and other
humanitarian
organizations in the
delivery of humanitarian
aid and assistance. The
Bush administration
suggests there will be
more civilian oversight
of AFRICOM than any
other military command.
Yet it remains hard to
see how African policy
will not be driven by
military engagement as
opposed to a genuine
partnership if the State
Department and USAID are
positioned under the
Defense Department in
AFRICOM.
Military commands are
simply not designed to
do humanitarian work.
For commissioned
officers and the Defense
Department, humanitarian
work will never trump
military objectives.
This reality was clearly
illustrated in Iraq when
the State Department and
humanitarian groups were
simply cut out of
planning discussions
around the build up to
the invasion and its
aftermath. AFRICOM
appears likely to follow
a similar trajectory.
The United States is
telling African
governments that AFRICOM
is simply a
restructuring of African
programs currently split
among the existing U.S.
global military units of
the U.S. European
Command (EUCOM), U.S.
Central Command
(CENTCOM), and U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM).
General William Ward,
AFRICOM’s designated
commander, made the case
for his new command at a
meeting with African
Union (AU) leaders in
Addis Ababa in early
November, arguing that
the United States has a
national interest in
helping to “stabilize”
Africa. “We come and do
things to assist our
African partners in
increasing their
capacity, their
capability to provide a
stable environment here
in Africa, "
he said. When asked
whether AFRICOM was
“simply a militarization
of the continent” he
replied, “Absolutely
false; not the case."
His answer is, of
course, contradicted by
the very reality of the
increasing
militarization of U.S.
foreign policy in Africa
over the last five
years.
Soldier of Fortune
AFRICOM is being
touted in Soldier of
Fortune and other
private military
contractor industry
publications as ushering
in a bountiful new job
market. In Iraq,
contractors hired by the
U.S. government were
accountable to no one,
resulting in
unacceptable human
rights violations. It is
reasonable to be
concerned that
mercenaries and other
contractors hired for
AFRICOM’s work will
follow a similar
pattern.
African voices from
civil society and from
democratically elected
African governments
should be heard and
heeded in decisions
relating to the location
of AFRICOM and its role
in Africa. Thus far,
only Liberia has given
any public support for
this initiative. Other
nations and regional
bodies including the
Southern African
Development Community
(SADC) have expressed
deep concern about a
deepened U.S. military
footprint on African
soil.
It’s important for
Africa advocates in the
United States to stand
in solidarity with
African civil society
voices on the continent
by challenging not only
the existence of AFRICOM
but seeking several
important changes to the
proposed program.
AFRICOM should decouple
the U.S. Department of
State and USAID from the
Defense Department to
ensure that U.S.-Africa
policy will be driven by
diplomacy, development
and genuine partnership,
not military engagement.
Clear lines of
accountability and
mechanisms for
transparency must be
established not only for
AFRICOM but also for any
private military
contractors employed by
the United States in
Africa to ensure the
protection of the rule
of law, democracy and
human rights on the
continent. Funding for
AFRICOM and the
increasing
militarization of aid
and engagement in Africa
should be reallocated to
serve a comprehensive
agenda that promotes
just security by
supporting sustainable
development, deeper debt
cancellation for
impoverished countries
in Africa, and fully
funding the fight
against HIV/AIDS and
other health challenges
on the continent.
AFRICOM raises more
questions then the Bush
administration is able
to answer at this point.
Who does the United
States intend to
stabilize by introducing
more military equipment
and approving more arms
sales into the region?
How does the United
States decide when to
use force in
“stabilizing” a
conflict? If people are
protesting unfair
corporate practices near
the grounds of an oil
company, will the United
States use force, or
encourage the use of
force by African
military units, to
protect these corporate
assets? Will U.S.
soldiers be accountable
in any way to African
governments or their
citizens? To what degree
will the United States
employ mercenaries and
other contractors in
Africa? Will U.S.
economic interests trump
the rule of law,
democracy and
accountability in
Africa? The answers to
the questions above will
go a long way to
determine whether
AFRICOM constitutes a
solution to a
bureaucratic challenge
of a region divided
between other global
military commands or is
actually likely to
encourage future
conflicts.
Kenya
It’s only February,
but the recent
turbulence in
heretofore-stable Kenya
brings U.S. policy
toward Africa in 2008
into focus. U.S.
interests in Kenya are
well documented. Kenya’s
role as a manufacturing
and financial hub for
East Africa makes it an
appealing partner for
Western investments. The
country’s geographic
location, bordering on
Somalia, a collapsed
state, also appeals to
U.S. security interests,
particularly given
President Mwai Kibaki’s
history of unswerving
support for the Bush
Administration’s “war on
terror.” It is therefore
not surprising that the
United States initially
responded to the dubious
official election
outcome and immediate
swearing in of Kibaki
for a second term by
calling on the Kenyan
people to “accept the
results…calmly.”
Once it became
apparent that the
elections were clearly
tarnished, various U.S.
officials backtracked
and engaged in a clumsy
game of semantics
regarding what was
actually said. But all
of Africa saw the U.S.
rally around Meles
Zenawi when he also
claimed to win the
Ethiopian election in
2005, despite
overwhelming evidence
that he and his
Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) had lost
badly. Zenawi
immediately cracked down
on the opposition and at
least 200 people were
killed and 700 were
injured. The EPRDF never
relinquished control of
power and two years
later, Zenawi’s
U.S.-backed troops
invaded Somalia.
U.S. support of
favored illegitimate
regimes like Zenawi’s in
Ethiopia and the
unhelpful, contradictory
U.S. diplomatic response
to the botched elections
in Kenya risk
encouraging leadership
around the continent to
ignore the will of their
citizens when they have
international backing.
Do these two instances
foreshadow the standard
AFRICOM response to
contested elections in
Africa?
Other Elections
In 2002, Kenya
appeared to be a shining
example of the
possibilities of
democracy and the
genuine emergence of
freedom and real
stability, after
frequent government
critic Kibaki was
elected in a contest
regarded as free and
fair. The spectacle of
Kenya in turmoil is
certainly distressing to
other democratic
movements across the
continent in a year that
will see several other
important African
elections that may
experience unhealthy
influence from U.S.
militarization.
Longtime U.S. foe,
but now a new oil friend
and military partner,
Angola, will have its
first legislative
elections in September.
Half of the country has
registered to vote in
the long-awaited polls
as citizens hope to
usher in a new era of
multiparty democracy
after Angola's 27-year
civil war ended in 2002.
The legislative
elections were initially
scheduled to be held in
1997. A presidential
election will follow
next year. The Angola
opposition group, the
National Union for the
Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA), has
accused the government
of deliberately delaying
the elections. U.S.
military operations in
Angola have been growing
by leaps and bounds
since 2002, with arms
sales up over of 1000%
and ongoing
International Military
and Training Program
trainings and security
agreements with the U.S.
Navy.
Divided Ivory Coast
leaders aim to hold
long-delayed elections
in the first half of
2008. Rebels have
controlled the northern
half of the West African
state and world's top
cocoa producer since a
2002-2003 civil war, but
President Laurent Gbagbo
and former rebel leader
Guillaume Soro, who
became prime minister in
April 2007, agreed in
March 2007 on a process
of disarmament,
reunification and
organization of
elections. Many
observers inside and
outside the country are
concerned by the slow
pace of progress on
practical aspects of
this agreement and fear
that the elections will
be postponed again.
Despite the fact that
the United States has so
clearly supported
undemocratic regimes
when it has served a
military, economic or
other political
interest, the United
States claims to be
aggressively working for
“democracy” in Zimbabwe.
Although some in the
Bush Administration seem
to be realizing that
overt U.S. engagement in
Zimbabwe has been
counter-productive, the
United States has been
intensifying sanctions
and increased funding of
opposition groups. This
economic pressure for
regime change not only
strengthens Robert
Mugabe’s hand when
blaming outside forces
for the current economic
crisis but it has the
potential to undermine
the opposition’s
legitimacy both now and
if they were to gain
power.
The United States
ought to cease and
desist from this
antagonistic unilateral
engagement and instead
step back to work with
other elements of the
international community
to develop a
multilateral engagement.
U.S. policies should
facilitate bringing
together regional actors
like Southern African
Development Community
and the African Union
with international
agencies in order to
promote the democratic
process, a national and
popular constitutional
reform process, economic
justice and human
rights.
A major shift in
South Africa’s political
landscape occurred at
the end of 2007, when
the African National
Congress (ANC) announced
that its intention to
back Jacob Zuma in the
2009 presidential
elections. Given the
ANC’s overwhelming
strength, Zuma will be
the heavy favorite to
win. Still, 2008 will be
an important year in the
lead up to elections
South Africa.
Sudan’s Multiple
Conflicts
Perhaps the most
interesting upcoming
African election from
the U.S. perspective
will be in the Sudan.
The U.S.-brokered and
Kenya-hosted
Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) of 2005
ended the civil war
between North and South,
and declared that the
year 2009 will witness
an unprecedented and
internationally
monitored general
election in the Sudan.
In 2008 it will be
determined whether these
elections are a
realistic possibility.
As deadly violence
against civilians raged
on in Darfur in 2007,
serious fractures
emerged in the
North-South peace
agreement. The complete
implementation of all
the provisions of the
CPA, including a
nationwide census to
prepare for the 2009
elections is critical to
the process of
democratizing Sudan and
achieving peace and
development for its
entire population.
There is little
indication, however,
that President Omar
Al-Bashir’s National
Congress Party (NCP)
regime in Khartoum has
any intention of
jeopardizing its hold on
power, and it will
attempt to delay the
election process as long
as possible unless it
faces credible pressure
from the international
community. If a
legitimate census is not
carried out and a
national electoral
commission is not
successfully established
and operating in 2008, a
serious blow will be
struck both to the CPA
and the ability of
Southerners to wait for
the 2011 referendum that
will determine if the
South will stay united
with the North of Sudan
or opt for separation.
This election will be
of particular interest
because the United
States has taken a
strong rhetorical stance
against the Sudanese
government regarding
Darfur while
simultaneously
maintaining strong
intelligence and
military ties with
Khartoum, including arms
sales and official
military trainings. On
December 31, Bush signed
divestment legislation
into law and pledged to
uphold sanctions against
the Sudanese government.
For the first time, the
Bush administration
seems to be becoming
more comprehensive, at
least in its public
statements, in its
approach to Sudan.
New Envoy
Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice swore
in Richard Williamson as
the new U.S. Special
Envoy to Sudan on
January 7 and the
following day Bush made
a statement committing
the U.S. to supporting
the implementation of
the CPA, the deployment
of an effective
peacekeeping force in
Darfur and the
diplomatic engagement
necessary to support
serious political
dialogue between the
region’s stakeholders.
Unfortunately, in the
past several years, we
have seen the Bush
administration use
powerful rhetoric that
in reality meant nothing
on the ground and masked
insufficient or
contradictory U.S.
diplomatic action.
Bush’s statement says
that the CPA, “laid the
groundwork for lasting
peace and unity for all
of Sudan,” a sentiment
that is popularly
promoted by policymakers
and advocates alike.
Africa Action’s dialogue
with Sudanese in each
region of the country
reveals that the CPA –
while a critical
agreement that must be
implemented – should not
be held up as an exact
model for all other
agreements.
Circumstances are
different in every
region and all new peace
processes must both
address these unique
regional characteristics
and avoid repeating some
of the mistakes of the
CPA by being more
inclusive, more
participatory, and more
transparent to the
general Sudanese
population.
The United States
must also follow through
with diplomatic
engagement once peace
agreements have been
signed to ensure timely
implementation. The real
process of peace and
justice happens after
the political
negotiations have been
concluded when the
agreements are put into
practice.
If the Bush
Administration is
serious in its
commitment to a
comprehensive and
productive Sudan policy,
it must prioritize these
areas over the “war on
terror.” It must use its
influence on Sudan to
ensure the prompt and
comprehensive
implementation of the
CPA. In Darfur, it must
use its leverage in the
international community
to resolve the
outstanding issues of UN
command and control of
the African Union/UN
hybrid peacekeeping
force known as UNAMID
and to ensure that this
peacekeeping force is
fully resourced and
deployed. The United
States and the
international community
must not allow Khartoum
to veto troop
contributions from
nations around the
world. Tensions with
Chad are heating up on
the western border of
Darfur, and the United
States must begin to
adopt a regional
perspective when
addressing this
conflict.
There are over 8,000
helicopters among NATO
countries, many of them
that could pass the “hot
and high” test needed to
work in Darfur’s extreme
heat and high levels of
dust. Darfur needs at
least 70 of these, but
contributing countries
are resisting, arguing
that they don’t have the
helicopters or that they
are anxious about the
command and control
issues of UNAMID. The
U.S. has the opportunity
to finance the provision
of helicopters by other
NATO countries as well
as leverage the
necessary international
leadership to ensure UN
command and control of
the force. For myriad
reasons, U.S. troops in
Darfur are neither
politically possible not
practically desirable.
However, there might be
ways for the U.S. to
loan the United Nations
the helicopters and
other support vehicles
that are essential for
UNAMID.
The deployment and
support of UNAMID must
go hand-in-hand with
renewed efforts to build
an inclusive and
participatory peace
process for the Darfur
region and for the North
of Sudan where new
conflict is emerging.
The International
Criminal Court must get
full international
support to do the
important work of
accountability in
Sudan’s many conflicts.
Horn of Africa
The primacy of U.S.
security interests and
militarization in the
Horn of Africa has gone
a long way towards
further destabilizing an
already volatile area.
As part of Operation
Enduring Freedom’s
Trans-Sahara
Counter-Terrorism
Initiative, U.S. naval
vessels have engaged in
several military strikes
in Somalia. Over a
thousand people have
died since U.S. war
planes bombed towns in
southern Somalia and up
to half a million people
have fled the eruption
of violence in Mogadishu
to live in camps. The
United States has allied
with unpopular and
repressive Ethiopian
President Meles Zenawi
and orchestrated the
invasion of Somalia by
Ethiopian troops. This
appears to have
accomplished little more
than another human
rights and humanitarian
crisis with hundreds of
thousands of internally
displaced people, untold
numbers of refugees in
neighboring countries,
and regular reports
noting the brutality of
rape, beatings, shooting
and indiscriminate
shelling by all parties
to the conflict in and
around Mogadishu.
The exercise has
weakened Ethiopia
considerably in its
still-unresolved border
dispute with Eritrea
(despite an
Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission
decision in 2002 which
the Ethiopian government
refuses to abide by even
after both countries’
repeated pledges that
the decision of the
commission would be
binding and final).
Ethiopia’s actions have
also angered and
inspired ethnic Somalis
in Ethiopia’s Ogaden
region. Given the
increasingly complicated
and tense reality on the
Horn today, it would be
interesting to see if
American officials
believe that U.S. policy
in the region actually
achieved any
counter-terrorism goals.
Ironically, it is only
in the internationally
unrecognized but clearly
democratic state of
Somaliland (known as
northwest Somalia), that
there is peace.
Great Lakes Region
East Africa’s Great
Lakes region is another
center of conflict where
heightened U.S.
diplomatic efforts,
rather than military
engagement, is critical.
Despite hopes brought on
by the democratic
presidential elections
of December 2006,
fighting between
Democratic Republic on
Congo (DRC) President
Joseph Kabila’s forces
and rebel groups
escalated after May
2007, when attempts to
integrate insurgents
lead by Laurent Nkunda
into the national army
collapsed. The
humanitarian crisis
sustained by this civil
strife, particularly in
the country’s eastern
Kivu province, has truly
been staggering.
According to a January
report by the
humanitarian group
International Rescue
Committee (IRC), the
DRC experiences around
45,000 conflict related
deaths per month, a 60%
higher death rate than
other similarly poor
African countries.
The situation in
Northern Uganda followed
a more positive trend in
2007, with a marked
decrease in violence
related to the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA)
and reengagement of the
Juba peace process.
Still, the region’s
complex interstate
politics and
unpredictable behavior
of rebel leaders like
the LRA’s Joseph Kony
mean that sustained
high-level international
involvement is critical
to the diplomatic
resolution of this
crisis. The United
States will need to
support multilateral
political negotiations
that address the
dimensions of the
region’s multiple
conflicts in order for
peace and stability to
be sustainable in any of
the Great Lakes
countries, and the DRC
as a whole. Sudan’s
future also depends
partly on successful
international efforts to
peacefully address the
conflict in Northern
Uganda, since renewed
LRA attacks in Southern
Sudan could derail
successful
implementation of the
CPA. Post-election
instability in Kenya, a
country that has
historically absorbed
refugees and hosted
political negotiations
for conflicts across
East Africa, makes U.S.
prioritization of
regional diplomatic
solutions to these
conflicts all the more
critical.
U.S.-Africa Economic
Policy
As U.S. policy
towards Africa becomes
increasingly
militarized, the U.S.
economic agenda and
energy concerns follow
close behind. During the
Cold War, U.S.
competition with the
Soviet Union led to
disastrous policy
decisions for the
African people; it
stunted the development
of democracy and
undermined economies.
U.S.-Africa policy is at
risk of repeating this
historical mistake as
the U.S. and China
compete for African
resources.
The U.S. will
continue to prioritize
trade liberalization and
development strategies
that favor U.S.
investments and
corporations.
U.S.-backed economic
restructuring programs
coming out of the
international financial
institutions persist in
depleting African
economic sovereignty as
leaders are forced to
comply with budget
ceilings and
privatization
prescriptions in order
to be eligible for new
loans or the hope of
debt cancellation.
One major impediment
to the liberation of
African economies from
the constraints of the
unjust international
financial system remains
the leadership of the
World Bank and the
International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Both these
institutions got new
leaders in 2007, with
former U.S. Special
Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick taking
charge of the Bank to
replace the disgraced
Paul Wolfowitz and
former French Finance
Minister Dominique
Strauss-Kahn becoming
IMF Managing Director.
Both institutions
continue to suffer from
a crisis of
international
legitimacy. The prior
records and official
actions so far of their
new leaders indicate
that each organization
intends to continue
business as usual,
serving the
ideologically defined
interests of the U.S.
and other wealthy member
states.
Because 2008 is an
election year in the
United States the
legislative calendar
will be short, yet
Congress still has
opportunities to take
major steps this year in
living up to the
rhetorical commitments
of the U.S. government
to genuinely promote
human development in
Africa. Opportunities
for effective policy
shifts exist in two
essential areas: the
cancellation of Africa’s
illegitimate debt, and
U.S. global HIV/AIDS
programs.
Budget Process
The U.S. government
budgeting process for FY
2009 is off to a notably
contentious start, in
part because of the
massive costs of the
wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the
looming national
economic downturn. In
this heated environment,
foreign assistance
programs of all types
are likely to be
vulnerable, including
U.S. development
programs that are
critical to human
development in Africa.
Despite repeated
promises from wealthy
countries to provide 0.7
% of their Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)
for development aid, not
one of these countries
has come close to that
figure, and the U.S.
continues to rank near
the bottom of all donor
countries for official
development assistance
worldwide. Halfway to
the 2015 deadline,
sub-Saharan Africa is
making the least
development progress of
all the regions in the
world and is not on
target to meet the
Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs).
The Bush
Administration's
proposals for foreign
aid for the upcoming
fiscal year still fall
far short of what the
United States can, and
should, provide. Nothing
better exemplifies this
than Bush’s spurious
announcement in May 2007
of the “doubling” of
funding for
international HIV/AIDS
programs to $30 billion
over the next five
years. For the current
fiscal year, 2008, U.S.
spending on global
HIV/AIDS programs totals
$6 billion. A true
doubling of current
funding levels would be
to $12 billion a year,
or $60 billion over five
years. In reality,
Bush’s proposal would
achieve flat funding
that would fail to keep
up with increasing
demand for HIV/AIDS
prevention, treatment
and care programs
worldwide, leading to an
overall decrease in the
percentage of people on
treatment globally
supported by U.S.
programs.
Trade Transparency
Prospects are slim
for progress at the
World Trade Organization
summit at the end of
2008, as the struggling
Doha round of trade
negotiations appears
unlikely to salvage any
hope of reforming the
global trade system to
promote equal
North-South relations
and economic development
in Africa and other
marginalized regions.
Bush’s “fast track”
authority to push
through free trade
agreements without the
Congressional oversight
mandated by the
Constitution expired in
July 2007, but programs
signed before this
deadline will be dealt
with by Congress
according to the fast
track process, as
happened with the
bilateral U.S-Peru free
trade agreement passed
in December. Since the
breakdown of the United
States-Southern Africa
Customs Union free trade
area (U.S.-SACU FTA)
negotiations in 2006,
bilateral negotiations
have been the main
approach to trade
liberalization pursued
by the Bush
Administration in
Africa, a trend that is
likely to continue.
The challenge of this
dynamic is that the U.S.
Trade Representative
(USTR) has been able to
have closed door
negotiations with
officials in countries
across the continent
that result in trade
commitments, but since
these discussions do not
technically constitute
formal free trade
agreements the USTR has
not been obliged to come
to Congress, effectively
keeping the public out
of the process. This
lack of transparency is
problematic for U.S. and
African civil society
organizations that
desire to address issues
like subsidies and
intellectual property
rights as they impact
HIV/AIDS treatment
access.
The United States is
Africa’s largest single
country market,
purchasing close to
one-third of the
region’s exports. Oil
constitutes over
three-quarters of U.S.
purchases and the
continued impacts of
both the African Growth
and Opportunity Act
(AGOA) and AFRICOM mean
that this share is only
likely to grow.
Amid fears of
economic downturn, U.S.
discourse has shifted
away from widespread
public support of free
trade, as presidential
candidates as disparate
as presidential
candidates John Edwards
and Mike Huckabee touted
their support for
“making trade fair.” The
primary source, however,
of this rhetoric’s
popularity is concern
over domestic job losses
and the U.S. economy.
Combined with the Bush
administration’s
continued adherence to
the pursuit of trade
liberalization through
bilateral negotiations
of the USTR, this means
that U.S. trade reforms
aimed at correcting
global trade
inequalities are
unlikely without a
significant effort by
advocates to shine a
spotlight on U.S.-Africa
trade negotiations.
Debt: Opportunities
and Threats
The Jubilee Act, a
bill that would lead to
the cancellation of 100%
of the debt of 67
impoverished countries
without the destructive
economic and policy
conditions found in
previous debt reduction
initiatives, is gaining
bipartisan support in
both the House of
Representatives and the
Senate. If made into
law, the act would be a
leap forward toward the
eradication of Africa’s
$200 billion-plus debt
burden that acts as the
biggest impediment to
sustained development on
the continent.
This legislation also
mandates the development
of a new legal framework
to address the
unscrupulous activities
of “vulture funds,”
private investment firms
that make massive
profits by purchasing
the debt of developing
countries at a reduced
price and then suing for
the full amount,
draining off the fiscal
space for education and
health care spending
that debt cancellation
generates. Although
hedge funds have been
engaged in shadowy
vulture practices since
the mid-1990s,
international attention
on the vultures
increased in 2007,
particularly with the
cases of Zambia and the
Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville).
This trend is likely
to continue in 2008, not
least because of the
close political and
financial relationship
between former U.S.
presidential candidate
Rudy Giuliani and the
notorious Paul Singer,
founder of Elliott
Associates and widely
acknowledged to be the
godfather of the vulture
investment strategy. At
least seven African
countries are at
immediate risk of being
targeted by vulture
funds, and unless action
is taken to curtail
their activities, the
ruthless actions of
groups like Elliott and
Donegal International
threaten to spoil the
social gains promised by
new debt cancellation.
HIV/AIDS: A Legacy
Issue
The revised
HIV-prevalence estimates
released at the end of
2007 by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and
UNAIDS have three major
implications. Africa is
still the center of the
global AIDS pandemic;
progress is possible if
evidence-based
prevention methods and
cutting edge treatment
programs are made
available to those in
need; and much, much
more has to be done to
address the world’s
greatest crisis.
As the HIV/AIDS
emphasis in his February
trip to Africa
demonstrates, Bush wants
to leave the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR) as a
celebrated part of his
legacy, but public
health experts agree
that this program has so
far fallen drastically
short of the funding
levels necessary to make
serious progress against
the pandemic. Effective
implementation of U.S.
global HIV/AIDS programs
under PEPFAR has also
been hampered by
ideological constraints
in this program and an
over-reliance on
name-brand drugs as
opposed to the more cost
effective generic
versions.
The next iteration of
this plan needs to
increase funding levels
to a minimum of $50
billion to fight global
HIV/AIDS over the next
five years, eliminate
ideological limitations
and provide the full
U.S. fair share of
support for the
multilateral Global Fund
to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and
Malaria. A vibrant
campaign by U.S.
activists has been
underway to educate the
2008 presidential
candidates about this
issue and stark
differences have emerged
between the Democratic
and Republican
candidates’ positions on
the global pandemic.
Meanwhile, some 1.7
million Africans (mostly
women) were newly
infected with HIV in
2007, and three-quarters
of the world’s
AIDS-related deaths that
year occurred on the
continent.
Oil Wealth: For
Whom?
Oil is at the center
of the intersection
between growing
militarization and U.S.
economic interests in
Africa. To many U.S. and
African civil society
groups, all roads seem
to point to Bush’s 2006
State of the Union
address where he stated
his intention to replace
75% of U.S. oil imports
from the Middle East by
2025. It is expected
that the United States
will get 25% of its oil
from Africa by 2015.
Unfortunately, many
Africans in
oil-producing countries
comment that the black
gold can be not only a
blessing, but also a
curse. Oil wealth often
fails to benefit the
majority of the
population in the
country in which it is
found. Conflict is
easily sparked and not
easily resolved in oil
rich regions, and the
environmental
consequences of
widespread extraction
can be devastating.
The key indicators to
monitor will be the U.S.
relations with top
African oil producing
nations and how
successful these
militarized countries
are at using their oil
wealth to eliminate
poverty, expand
democratic reforms, and
develop independent
judiciaries and justly
enforced rule of law.
While Nigeria remains
the biggest oil producer
in Africa, the
government revenues of
five other sub-Saharan
countries are largely
based on oil. Nigeria’s
2.5 million barrels per
day account for nearly
80% of government
revenues. Despite its
wealth, more than 70% of
the population lives in
poverty and Nigeria
ranks 158th out of 177
countries on the Human
Development Index (HDI).
Angola’s oil
production is expected
to reach 2 million
barrels per day in 2008.
Its oil and gas
industries have
attracted over $20
billion in foreign
direct investment since
2003. Oil accounts for
over 40% of Angola’s GDP
and almost 90% of the
government's revenues.
It ranks 162nd on the
HDI. Sudan produces some
520,000 barrels per day
despite internal
upheaval, including the
unrest in the western
region of Darfur and a
tenuous grip on the 2005
peace treaty that ended
the decades-long war
between North and South.
In spite of increasing
investment by China,
Turkey and other foreign
states, Sudan remains
one of the world's
poorest countries:
number 147 on the Human
Development Index.
Equatorial Guinea, the
Republic of Congo and
Gabon round out the top
six African oil
producers, countries
that rank 127th, 139th
and 119th on the HDI
respectively.
Climate Change
The issue of climate
change is a rapidly
rising priority on the
agenda of international
policymakers, and will
remain an important
concern for the U.S.
presidential elections
this November. The risks
of climate change to
Africa are tremendous,
and African scientists
point to the extreme
droughts of the past 25
years as evidence that
the impacts are already
being felt. If climate
change continues at
present rates,
unpredictable
fluctuation in rainfalls
and more frequent and
severe droughts threaten
agriculture, the
backbone of most African
economies. Higher
incidence of floods and
other natural disasters
would challenge even the
continent’s most stable
and economically
thriving communities.
UN experts predict
that these impacts will
be most concentrated in
the Sahel and central
Southern Africa,
although if sea levels
rise, densely populated
river delta areas like
those found in Egypt and
West Africa will also be
at risk. In April 2007,
the UN’s
Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate change
predicated that within
decades, temperature
increases may render
around 600,000 square
kilometers of arable
land on the continent
too dry to cultivate.
According to the
2007/2008
UNDP Human Development
Report, “Semi-arid
areas of sub-Saharan
Africa with some of the
highest concentrations
of poverty in the world
face the danger of
potential productivity
losses of 26% by 2060.”
While about one-third of
Africans already live in
areas prone to periodic
droughts, various models
place the number of
newly drought-affected
individuals in Africa at
75-250 million after
just a one degree
Celsius rise in global
temperatures, a change
that some experts
predict could happen as
soon as 2020.
The threats posed by
climate change are
intricately linked to
existing human
development challenges
such as food insecurity,
conflict, and public
health problems like the
absence of clean water.
In areas where rainfall
increases, swampier
environments with more
standing water will
facilitate breeding of
mosquitoes and thus
greater spread of
malaria and other
insect-born diseases.
People living with HIV
or AIDS will face
malnutrition as food
shortages occur,
impeding the
effectiveness of
treatment regimens.
In the short term,
the current trajectory
of climate change could
erase what human
development progress has
occurred in Africa in
recent years. Few
African countries
possess the capacity to
invest in adaptive
policies or
technological mechanisms
to soften climate
change’s socioeconomic
impacts, as do rich
nations. Archbishop and
Nobel Peace Prize
Laureate Desmond Tutu
terms this inequality
“adaptation apartheid,”
where “people are being
left to sink or swim
with their own
resources.” In the
longer run, climate
change is a threat to
all humanity, and the
United States and other
wealthy nations have a
duty to address the
global peril that they
are primarily
responsible for. While
some emerging economies
such as China and India
are beginning to produce
large amounts of
greenhouse gases,
according to UN
estimates, sub-Saharan
Africa’s entire
population, rapidly
approaching one billion
people, emits less
carbon dioxide than the
23 million Americans who
live in Texas alone.
U.S. policymakers
must become leaders in
the international effort
to take on the climate
crisis head on – this
means finding ways to
drastically curtail
their own emissions as
well as facilitating
economic growth in
developing countries
that is environmentally
sustainable. Low-carbon
technology transfers
should become a
fundamental part of
development assistance
programs.
Simultaneously, rich
countries should help
African nations and
other impoverished
countries build up the
infrastructure and
economic mechanisms
necessary to mitigate
the harmful effects of
climate change. If not,
they will be directly
responsible for the
humanitarian crises of
unprecedented scale
described above.
Conclusion
Despite
being the most stretched
out campaign in American
history, the 2008 U.S.
presidential election is
marked by the typical
absence of any serious
discussion of Africa. It
is as if Africa has
already been ceded to
the Department of
Defense and therefore
out of the view of the
American public. In
contrast with the
accelerating
militarization of
U.S.-Africa relations
described above, this
silence is deafening.
The next president of
the United States faces
a stark policy choice.
Will he or she continue
to pursue “stability” by
further militarizing the
continent and flooding
it with even more guns?
Or will the United
States choose instead to
embrace a strategy that
invests in socioeconomic
infrastructure,
champions fair terms of
trade for African
products and promotes
sustainable economic
development that
addresses the
aspirations and welfare
of the African people?
Gerald LeMelle is the
Executive Director of
Africa Action and a
contributor to
Foreign Policy In Focus.
Michael Swigert, Africa
Action’s Department of
Policy Analysis and
Communication Program
Associate provided
research support.
Source:
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4949
| Foreign Policy In
Focus (FPIF.org)