Story Filed: Tuesday, November 27, 2001 8:20 PM EST
Washington, DC, Nov 27, 2001 (allAfrica.com/All
Africa Global Media via COMTEX) -- The accusation that
Somalia is a terrorist
state is based on deduction and supposition not proven
fact, according to Ken Menkhaus, an associate professor
at Davidson College who is a specialist on
Somalia and its Islamic
movements.
Menkhaus, a former special political advisor in
United Nations Somalia
operations, was speaking at a Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace symposium on "Africa, Islam, and
Terrorism" on Tuesday.
There is little direct information on terrorist
networks in Africa, he said. Media and government
"depend on deductive reasoning" to conclude that Islamic
states, failed states, poor states or inaccessible
states are likely havens of terrorist groups. "By these
criteria, Somalia makes
the short list."
The United States "should avoid direct intervention
in Somalia at all
costs, short of some clear and present danger," Menkhaus
warned.
Bush Administration officials have accused the group
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya or "Unity of Islam" of being a
terrorist organization, but according to Menkhaus, that
characterization ignores a more complex reality. Al-Itihaad
was formed in the late 1980s, a half-dozen years before
Al-Quaeda, has traditionally been more of a social
movement than a political movement, but it wears several
different faces in Somalia.
The group is not considered a highly organized or
structured organization by most knowledgeable analysts.
"You can't say, 'Aha, we know who the leader is,'" says
Ted Dagne of the Congressional Research Service and a
careful observer of the region. "You can't say: 'These
are what their plans are.' Al-Itihaad operates
differently in different parts of
Somalia. We should be navigating this very
carefully."
The press exaggerates, says Dagne. "They're looking
to break a story on the second phase of the war [against
terrorism]. Somalia is
easy speculation."
And he warns: "By lumping everyone together, we may
wind up creating an organization that is truly
anti-American and evil."
Most of Al-Itihaad's energy is concentrated on their
vision - fundamentalist but not necessarily terrorist -
for fixing a shattered Somalia,
says Menkhaus. They "are most concerned with a domestic,
not an international agenda," says Menkhaus. That
requires care in a clan-conscious
Somalia. "They have attempted to integrate
into local communities and while many have shaved their
beards, people know who they are. They are not being
secretive, they are being discreet."
In Puntland, using a tactic that Menkhaus called a "Turabi
strategy" (in reference to the now-jailed Sudanese
Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi), Al-Itihaad has
burrowed into the judiciary and mid-levels of government
where they exercise influence, "but are not trying to
take over."
And while there has been some violence near the
Kenyan border, and elsewhere in the region, Menkhaus
called Somalia
"inhospitable terrain" for al-Quaeda because of "highly
unpredictable and unstable alliances," that are typical
of the Horn nation. Also, said Menkhaus, there is a
traditional "absence of secrecy" in
Somalia, and if you are a
non-Somali, "it is difficult to have what you are doing,
not known."
Press speculation that Somalia,
along with Sudan and Yemen will be targeted next in the
U.S. global anti-terror campaign has been intense,
particularly following the targeting of Somali company
Al-Barakaat as a conduit for terrorist funds. Al-Barakaat
is the largest company in Somalia,
with interests in telecommunications, banking, postal
services and refreshment.
The company has had to close services throughout
Somalia, after British and
American business partners terminated their relationship
with the group. The move has greatly limited telephone
contact between the country and the outside world and
cut off a channel widely used by Somali expatriates to
send money back home.
While acknowledging that
Somalia could be useful as a transshipment
point for the movement of money and men, Menkhaus said
there is "much we don't know." He described the freezing
of assets of Al-Barakaat by the Bush Administration as
taking "a sledgehammer approach."
Another panelist at the symposium was David Shinn, a
former ambassador to Ethiopia, and also a past director
of the State Department's Office of East African
Affairs. He said Al-Barakaat's presence in the United
States "is individuals who operate out of 7-11s, little
shops. they're not big fish."
Shinn, who served during the Clinton Administration,
suggested the United States was paying a price now, for
past inattention. "Trying to get any interest in
Somalia was like knocking
your head against the wall."
The Administration's approach makes little sense for
a U.S. government seeking to win friends, allies and
understanding, says Ted Dagne. "I am not going to love
you if you come into my house and take my food away. I
will respect you if you say, 'Here is a drink to go
along with your food.'"
According to Bronek Szynalski, UN Humanitarian
Coordinator - Horn of Africa, cash remittances from
abroad have fallen by 50% in the wake of the freezing of
Al-Barakaat's operations. The loss of hard currency
inflows, a punishing drought, inflation due to the
depreciation of the Somali shilling and the flare-up of
Rift Valley fever which is devastating livestock and
therefore exports, are all factors causing deep gloom
among humanitarian workers.
It isn't clear what form action against a perceived
terrorist threat from Somalia
might take, but a concerned Szynalski, speaking at a
press conference in Washington, DC, to launch the UN's
consolidated appeal for humanitarian aid, said that
while he and colleagues were hoping there wasn't going
to be any political intervention in the country, they
were making "contingency plans".
by Charles Cobb Jr.
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